In this volume, Charles Kindleberger makes a powerful case against the idea that any one model could be used to unlock the basic secret of economic history. It is essentially an exercise in methodology, addressed to economists and economic historians alike. He argues that too many economists discover a relationship or a uniformity in economic behaviour, develop a model, and use it to explain more than it is capable of, including, on occasion, all economic behaviour. These lectures discuss four 'laws' (...) in economics to show how uniformities can illuminate economic history in particular aspects. They illustrate the view that the economist or economic historian seeking to test analysis against historical data should have a variety of different models, and not just one. The implication is that however scientific and technical the tools, choosing them carefully to fit particular circumstances is itself an art. (shrink)

Originally published in 1987 to commemorate the 40 th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, this fascinating collection of essays, from an eminent ‘insider’ to the Marshall Plan, combines economics, politics and history to provide authoritative and personal insights into the creation of one of the greatest foreign aid programmes of the twentieth century. Any reader interested in the Marshall Plan itself, the inner workings of a major act of US foreign policy, and its many economic, political and historical facets will (...) welcome the reissue of this valuable book from one of America’s most distinguished economists. (shrink)

Analysts such as Steven Horwitz, with strong prior beliefs, are seldom impressed by mere fact and tend to explain away empirical deviations from their theories. The belief that markets are moved only by fundamentals and not by occasional faddism and overshooting rests on the assumption that market participants form their opinions independently, when in fact they are from time to time driven by emulation. The belief that markets are rational and well?informed but government officials and central bankers incompetent is implausible (...) on its face. The period since 1970 has seen bubble after bubble, some of which seemed likely to lead to financial crisis had it not been for the Federal Reserve. (shrink)